CARRIAGE OF HAZARDOUS CARGOES BY SEA-THE HNS
CONVENTION
Peter Wetterstein*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In April 1947 the freighter Grandcamp caught fire and exploded while being
loaded with ammonium nitrate in the port of Texas City. A total of 468
people were killed, and the accident also caused considerable material
damage.' Since then many accidents and incidents involving hazardous
cargoes have occurred-albeit not so severe as the Texas City disaster.2
However, the volume of hazardous and noxious cargoes (other than oil)
carried by sea seems to be increasing constantly,' and along with it the risk
for serious accidents.
An International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage
in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by
Sea [JINS] was adopted on May 3, 1996, at the end of a diplomatic
conference held at the headquarters of the International Maritime Organiza-
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'See The Safe Transportof Dangerous,Hazardousand HarmfulCargoesby Sea, 25 EUR.

TRANSP. L. 779 (1990).
2 Large quantities of substances other than oil (both packaged and in bulk) are
regularly
washed up on European coasts. A relatively high proportion of shipping accidents also in the
North Sea have involved ships carrying dangerous chemical substances. See EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT:

REPORT ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL

DAMAGE CAUSED BY OIL SPILLS FROM

SHIPS: EUROPE ENVIRONMENT, DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT TO EUROPE ENVIRONMENT 5 (No.

396-20 October 1992).
3 In 1991 it was estimated that hazardous cargoes represent 10-15% of the volume of total
seaborne trade. See 0. Grapow, HNS-the CaseforShared Liability,313 FAIRPLAY (No. 5619)
30, 32 (July 11, 1991).
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tion (IMO).4 The HNS Convention was adopted by consensus, which was
regarded as consolidating the IMO's role as a developer of international
maritime legislation, especially after 1984, when a diplomatic conference
failed to reach agreement on an earlier draft convention elaborated by the
IMO. A second failure could well have led to the introduction of regional
legislation in this field (e.g., within the EU), which would have been
detrimental not only to the shipping industry engaged in the international
carriage of hazardous cargo, but also to efforts to harmonize maritime law
on a global basis.'
The HNS Convention was thus needed to establish an international system
for solving problems of compensation linked with the carriage of hazardous
and noxious substances. The present rules on compensation do not provide
enough safeguards for the interests of claimants in view of the huge damage
that may be caused in connection with the carriage of hazardous cargo.
With the exception of the conventions governing oil pollution liability6
and nuclear liability,7 internationally accepted rules concerning shipowner's
liability for damage caused in connection with carriage of hazardous
substances have so far been lacking. Liability has been based on national

See Final Act of the International Conference on Hazardous and Noxious Substances and
Limitation of Liability, May 2, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1406. The conference was attended by
delegates from 73 countries and representatives of inter-governmental and non-governmental
organizations. See 3 IMO NEWs 8 (1996).
See also id. at 9.
6 The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, November
29, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 45 (1970), MARINE ENVIRONMENT LAW at 4.501 (amended by Protocols
of 1992) [hereinafter Civil Liability Convention]; International Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, December
18, 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57, 11 I.L.M. 284 (1972), MARINE ENVIRONMENT LAW at 4.503
(amended by Protocols of 1992) [hereinafter Fund Convention].
' Liability questions in the field of carriage of nuclear substances are regulated in the 1960
Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (revised by the 1964
Additional Protocol; seethe 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage,
together with the 1963 Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 1960 and the
1971 Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear
Material. The Standing Committee has been considering different ways in which the regime
established by the Vienna Convention (1963) might be improved. In addition, effort has been
focussed on the development of a convention on supplementary funding (SFC). The work
resulted in a Diplomatic Conference which adopted on 12 September 1997 two instruments,
i.e., the Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
(Document NUDC/6.Add.1), and the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for
Nuclear Damage (Document NL/DC/6.Add.2).
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rules--often general rules of tort law. Many countries apply a rule of
liability for fault,8 which implies that the claimant has to prove that there
has been fault on the part of the shipowner. If, on the other hand, strict
liability is applied, the claimant's burden of proof is eased since strict
liability also covers unproven fault. 9 Consequently, the rule on strict
liability adopted in the HNS Convention strengthens the position of the
claimant.
The rules on limitation of liability in the existing conventions, that is, the
conventions of 1924, 1957 and 1976, ° are also to the disadvantage of
claimants. In the event of a serious accident involving hazardous substances,
the limits of liability may have the result that the claimants do not receive
adequate compensation. Thus, it was desirable to achieve internationally
unified liability rules in this field. Because HNS accidents often have
international dimensions, nationally and regionally differing rules and
principles work to the disadvantage of all persons involved: the shipowner,
the claimant, the insurer, etc.
It remains to be seen whether the solution achieved is considered
acceptable to such a number of states that one can talk about "internationally
uniform rules"."' With this issue in mind, I will comment below on the
HNS Convention.

See, e.g., FINNISH MARITIME CODE (FMC) ch. 7, sec. 1.
9 See also Peter Wetterstein, Damagefrom InternationalDisastersinthe Light of Tort and
InsuranceLaw(general report submitted to Association Internationale du Droit des Assurances
(AIDA)) 8TH WORLD CONGRESS ON INSURANCE LAW IN COPENHAGEN, 18-22 JUNE 1990, at

53-62.
10 See International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the
Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Seagoing Vessels, Aug. 25, 1924; International
Convention Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of Sea-Going Ships,
GoingShips, 1957 A.M.C. 972, 1968 U.K.T.S. No. 52 (Cmd. 3678). International Convention
on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, Nov. 19, 1976, reprinted in 6 Benedict on
Admiralty Doc. No. 5-4 (7th ed. 1986); see also PATRICK GRIGGS & RICHARD WILLIAMS,
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR MARITIME CLAIMS 7-84 (1991) (commenting on Convention

on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims).
" The HNS Convention was opened for signature on October 1, 1996, and will remain
open for signature for 1 year until September 30, 1997. Only the United Kingdom had signed
the Convention as of March 1997. The entry into force conditions of the HNS Convention
are written into Art. 46: "This Convention shall enter into force eighteen months after the
date on which the following conditions are fulfilled: (a) at least twelve States, including four
States each with not less than 2 million units of gross tonnage, have expressed their consent
to be bound by it, and (b) the Secretary-General has received information in accordance with
article 43 that those persons in such States who would be liable to contribute pursuant to
article 18, paragraphs 1(a) and (c) have received during the preceding calendar year a total
quantity of at least 40 million tonnes of cargo contributing to the general account". 35 I.L.M.
1406, 1428 (1996).
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CONVENTION

The HNS Convention governs liability for damage in connection with the
carriage of hazardous and noxious substances by sea. The substances
covered are defined by reference to existing lists of hazardous substances in
IMO conventions and codes (Art. 1.5). As these lists and codes are
amended, the HINS Convention will be tacitly amended as well. The
geographical application of the HNS Convention is laid down in Art. 3,2
and "damage" is defined in Art. 1.6. The HNS Convention defines damage
as including loss of life or personal injury, loss of or damage to property
outside the ship carrying HNS substances, loss or damage by contamination
of the environment, and the costs of preventive measures as well as further
loss or damage caused by them. The Convention does not apply to claims
arising out of any contract for the carriage of goods and passengers, to
pollution damage as defined in the Civil Liability Convention, 1969 (as
amended) 3 or to damage caused by radioactive materials of class 7 (Art.
4).
The HNS Convention strengthens the position of the claimants in several
important ways. The Convention introduces strict liability for the shipowner
(Art. 7), higher limits of liability than the present general limitation regimes
(Art. 9), and a system of compulsory insurance (or other financial security)
and insurance certificates (Art. 12). If the damage exceeds the shipowner's
limitation amounts (min. 10 million SDRs, max. 100 million SDRs (Special
Drawing Rights)), the owner/insurer is financially incapable of meeting the
obligations under the HNS Convention, or no liability for the damage arises
for the shipowner, the claimant may get compensation from the International
Hazardous and Noxious Substances Fund [HNS Fund]. Compensation will
be paid from the HNS Fund up to a maximum of 250 million SDRs,
including compensation paid by the shipowner/insurer (Art. 14).
Contributions to the Fund are levied on persons (primarily chemical
companies) in the Contracting States who receive a certain minimum
quantity of HNS cargo during a calendar year. This obligation is based on
a "post-event contribution system", that is, the amount of the contribution is
determined primarily by the claims submitted to the HNS Fund the preceding

12 See

infra note 54.

"aIt is to be noted, that oil transports not governed by the CLC-system, i.e., nonpersistent
oils, fall under the HNS Convention. Furthermore, the former system does not cover damage
caused by fire or explosion.
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year and by the volume of HNS cargo the receiver imported during that year
(Articles 16-19). The administration of the HNS Fund is handled by an
Assembly consisting of all Contracting States, which will normally meet
once a year, and a Secretariat headed by a Director (Art. 24).
The compensation system under the HNS Convention thus resembles the
international oil pollution compensation conventions (as amended), 4 which
provide a consistent and proficient international regime for compensating
injured parties for oil pollution damage. It is to be noted that the system has
functioned well. Compensation has been paid relatively promptly-bearing
in mind the frequently complex issues involved-and the claimants have in
most cases received adequate compensation. 5 Similarly, the success of the
HNS system will very much depend upon administrative simplicity, as well
as the adequacy of compensation paid. It was important that a revision
mechanism which makes possible rapid and simplified inflation and other
adjustments was included in the HNS Convention (Art. 48).
Following is a more detailed study of the PINS Convention.
III.

NOTES ON THE

HNS

CONVENTION

A. Definitions
One desired aim, at least from the point of view of the Nordic countries,
was that the HNS Convention would be given the broadest possible
coverage. In this respect one can, however, conclude that the definitions in
Art. 1 are not fully satisfactory.
Residues from previous carriage in bulk of substances with a low
flashpoint were covered in the draft of the HNS Convention 16 (Art. 1.5.(b)).

4 The Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil

Pollution Damage, 1969, and the Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on
the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971.
The Protocols entered into force on 30 May 1996.
S See, e.g., Colin de la Rue, Oil Spill Compensation- Long Awaited Changes in Force,
10 P&I INTERNATIONAL 2 (No. 5 Pollution Supplement 1996) and Mans Jacobsson, The
InternationalCon ventions on CompensationforOil PollutionDamage, BIMCO REV. 228-229
(1995). See also DAVID W. ABECASSIS & RICHARD L. JARASHOW, OIL POLLUTION FROM
SHIPS: INTERNATIONAL, UNITED KINGDOM AND UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 193-302
(1985) (presenting detailed survey of international oil pollution compensation system).
6
1 Seelnternational Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage
in Connection
with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, July 21, 1995, I.M.O.
LEG/CONF. 10/6(a) (draft).
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Damage caused by other residues fell, however, outside the Convention.
During the London conference the final text was amended to include in
general residues from cargoes carried in bulk. Considering the fact that
residues other than those with a low flashpoint may be hazardous, the
amendment was appropriate.' 7 On the question of bunker spills, however,
the conference did not succeed in reaching an agreement; rather, liability for
such damage 8 is to be covered by a separate convention. Considering the
aim to achieve internationally uniform systems of liability, such a splitting
of the maritime liability into several conventions does not seem wise.
Neither does it stimulate the insurance market to provide adequate liability
coverage.
According to Art. 1.5.(a)(iv) of the draft HNS Convention, some
radioactive materials (pursuant to the IMDG Code) were included in the
Convention. On the other hand, it was proposed in Art. 4.3b that damage
caused by radioactive materials would fall outside the HNS Convention,
provided that a plant operator was liable for the transport pursuant to the
international conventions on nuclear liability. 9 The question of radioactive
materials was a highly controversial issue during the London conference, and
the result was that these materials were excluded from the HNS Convention
(Art. 4.3.(b)). It was argued that most of the radioactive materials were
already covered by other instruments, and the conference decided that the
remainder-such as materials used in hospitals and in making watches-all
represented a relatively low risk.2" The conference adopted a resolution
recommending that the IMO and the International Atomic Energy Agency
work together to define and consider issues of liability and compensation for
damage occurring during the transport of radioactive materials.2

Art. 1.5. in the 1992 Protocol to the 1969 Civil Liability Convention.
"SAccording to statistics from the Finnish Board of Navigation there have been 29
17 Cf

accidents resulting in bunker spills (a total of 938.7 tons) in Finnish waters during 1969-95.
According to a submission by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (1997) to the IMO
Legal Committee, the position globally is that bunker spills from ships other than oil tankers:
1) account for a significantly greater number of spills; 2) represent half of the total number
of pollution claims; and 3) are significantly more expensive to clean up than spills from oil
tankers.
19See supra note 7.
20 IMO NEWS, supra note 4, at 9.
21
See RESOLUTION ON LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE OCCURRING DURING
THE TRANSPORT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS, May 2, 1996, IMO LEG/CONF.10/DC.3.
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The appropriateness of the exclusion of radioactive materials from the
HNS Convention seems doubtful. A comprehensive liability/compensation
system for the carriage of nuclear materials by sea is lacking, and it may,
indeed, take some time to get one. In view of the aim to achieve a broad
coverage of hazardous transports, it seems to me that the HNS Convention
ought to have included all radioactive materials which are not covered by the
nuclear liability conventions (as later amended). It should also be borne in
mind that low-active materials may cause significant damage. Furthermore,
it is hard to find any decisive insurance arguments for the exclusion.
Likewise, the issue of whether or not coal and other low-hazard materials
carried in bulk (MHB)22 should be covered by the HNS Convention was
much debated during the conference. The text of Art. 1.5.(a)(vii) of the
draft HNS Convention seemed to cover, inter alia, coal. A clear majority
of delegations at the London conference, especially countries with an
extensive import or export of coal, supported its exclusion, because, in their
opinion, reliable statistics showed that coal could not cause any damage to
the environment or outside the ship. The emission of methane was not
deemed a safety hazard justifying the inclusion of coal, which furthermore
would substantially increase transport and insurance costs, thus causing
serious disadvantages to the national economies of several countries.23
Since the MHBs may cause damage, for example, in connection with fires
and explosions, these materials should have been covered by the HNS
Convention. During the conference it was also pointed out (the Nordic
countries, among others, expressed this view) that, due to the low hazard
ratio, coal and other MHB materials would initially not be required to
contribute to the HNS Fund, as long as these materials kept their present
safety records.
Art. 1.6. of the HNS Convention contains the definition of "damage,"
which is similar to other international conventions.24 It is significant that

22 "Materials Hazardous in Bulk," including coal, wood chips, and metal sulfide

concentrates.

23 IMO NEWS, supra note 4, at 9.

The proposal to exclude coal from the HNS

Convention was put forward by Italy and supported by, inter alia, Australia, Japan and
Canada. See Mario Guttieres & Mary Ellen Sikabonyi, Country Reports: Italy, 55 EUR.
ENVTL. L. REv. 199 (1996).
24 Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused during the Carriage of Dangerous
Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels, 1989, Art. 1.10; Protocol of 1992 to

Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, Art.
1.6.; and Council of Europe Convention on Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to
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compensation for "loss of profit" is explicitly mentioned in the definition to
make it clear that so-called pure economic loss (i.e., economic loss
unconnected with personal injury or property damage) is also covered by the
HNS Convention.
Such loss may hit, for example, the fishing industry
and other sea-related commercial activity. However, the applicable national
rules of law still have to answer many questions: including, who has the
right to assert a claim for compensation (considering that infringement of socalled public rights also may result in pure economic losses);26 how far
does the right to compensation for pure economic losses extend (considering,
inter alia, questions of proximate cause and remoteness of the damage); etc.
National solutions might impede the development of a uniform interpretation
of the definition of "damage" which is essential for the functioning of the
regime of compensation established by the HNS Convention. Some
guidance for solving these issues may, however, be obtained from the
practice of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund [IOPC Fund]
established under the International Convention on the Establishment of an
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971.27
The IOPC Fund has, over the years, gained considerable experience as
regards the interpretation and application of the international oil pollution
compensation system. In the context of more than 70 incidents the Fund has
also had to deal with the admissibility of claims for pure economic loss.28

the Environment, 1993, Art. 2.7.
" 'Damage' means: ... (c) loss or damage by contamination of the
environment caused by the hazardous and noxious substances, provided that compensation for
impairment of the environment other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be limited
to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken; and
25

26

Art. 1.6.:

See generallyPeter Wetterstein, A ProprietaryorPossessorylnterest: A Conditio Sine

Qua Non for Claiming Damages for Environmental Impairment, in HARM TO THE
ENVIRONMENT: THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION AND THE ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES 29-54
(Peter Wetterstein ed., 1996).
27 Fund Convention, supra note 6.
28 See Peter Wetterstein, Oil Pollution and Pure Economic Losses, in TOME XIV
ANNUAIRE DE DROIT MARITIME ET OCtANIQUE

37-52 (1996).

See also Wu

CHAO,

POLLUTION FROM THE CARRIAGE OF OIL BY SEA: LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION 299-335

(1996). From its establishment in October 1978 up to 31 December 1995, the IOPC Fund has
been involved in the settlement of claims arising out of seventy-two incidents. The total
compensation paid by the IOPC Fund amounts to some GBP 116 million. See INTERNATIONAL OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUND. ANNUAL REPORT 32 (1995).
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The definition of "damage" in the HNS Convention also makes it clear
that claims for damage to the environment ("compensation for impairment
of the environment") are admissible. Although "environment" is not defined
in the HNS Convention, the notion seems to cover damage to the environment as such (per se), for example, damage to species of flora and fauna, to
food chains in the environment, to aesthetic and cultural values, etc.29 The
right to compensation is, however, explicitly restricted to "costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken."
This wording gives rise to some unanswered questions with possible
detrimental effect on the efforts to achieve international uniformity. How
should the costs for restoration of the environment be calculated?3" What
are reasonable measures of reinstatement? 31 Should interim losses of
29 See Peter Wetterstein, supra note 26, at 30 with references. For example, Art. 2.10.
of the Council of Europe Convention on Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the
Environment, 1993, contains the following specification: " 'Environment' includes: - natural
resources both abiotic and biotic, such as air, water, soil, fauna and flora and the interaction
between the same factors; - property which forms part of the cultural heritage; and - the
characteristic aspects of the landscape".
30The issue of measurement of damages for purpose of liability for loss or destruction of
natural resources has been debated heatedly, especially in the U.S. See, e.g., Charles B.
Anderson, Litigatingand Settling a NaturalResource Damage Claim in the United States:
The DefenseLawyer'sPerspective,in27 HARM TO THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 26, at 207219; Carol A. Jones & Theodore D. Tomasi & Stephanie W. Fluke, Public and Private
Claims in Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 111 (1996);
RAYMOND J. Kopp & V. KERRY SMITH (ED.), VALUING NATURAL ASSETS: THE ECONOMICS
OF NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (1993). See also PETER WETTERSTEIN,
ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPAIRMENT LIABILITY IN ADMIRALTY:

A NOTE ON COMPENSABLE

DAMAGE UNDER U.S. LAW 148-153, 160-181 (1992); Bj6rn Sandvik, Broadening the Scope

of Compensationfor Damage to NaturalResources - What Can We Learn from US. Law?
218 MARIUS (1995); MARIE-LOUISE LARSSON, ON THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE.
LIABILITY AND REPARATION 535-556 (1997).
3 For example, the CMI GUIDELINES ON OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE, adopted in Sydney
1994, contain the following specification (12(d)): "In determining whether measures of
reinstatement are reasonable, account is to be taken of all the relevant technical factors
including (but not limited to) the following: (i) the extent to which the observed state of the
environment, and any changes therein, are to be regarded as damage actually caused by the
incident in question, as distinct from other factors whether man-made or natural; (ii) whether
the measures are technically feasible and likely to contribute to the re-establishment at the site
in question of a healthy biological community in which the organisms characteristic of that
community are present and are functioning normally; (iii) the speed with which the affected
environment may be expected to recover by natural processes and the extent to which the
reinstatement measures concerned may accelerate (or inadvertently impede) natural processes
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natural resources and services (lost "use values") be compensated?3 2 If
free from
restoration of the environment is not possible, is the shipowner
33
costs?
restoration
for
claim
to
standi
locus
has
Who
liability?
As noted above, the HNS Convention adopts "damage" definitions similar
to those in other conventions. However, some clarifications ought to have

of recovery, and (iv) whether the cost of the measures is in proportion to the damage or the
results which could reasonably be expected". In the U.S. a cost/benefit analysis seems to be
the basis for the "grossly disproportionate test": "The relationship of the expected costs of
the proposed actions to the expected benefits from the restoration, rehabilitation, replacement,
and/or acquisition of equivalent resources". See 43 CFR § 11.82(d)(1). See also, e.g., Frank
B. Cross, NaturalResource Damage Valuation, 42 VAND. L. REv. 334 (1989), and Thomas
S. Stewart, Utah v. Kennecott Corporation: Seeking Ultimate Values with the 'Grossly
Disproportionate'Testfor NaturalResource Damage Assessments, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.
REv. 887-932 (1994). See also Puerto Rico v. The S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652 (1st
Cir. 1980).
32 In the U.S. natural resource damage claims under CERCLA (Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980) and OPA (Oil Pollution
Act of 1990) have three basic components: 1) the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing,
or acquiring the equivalent of, the damaged natural resources; 2) the diminution in value of
those natural resources pending recovery of the resource to baseline (cf OPA, 33 U.S.C.
§ 2706 (d)(1)(B)); and 3) the reasonable cost of assessing those damages. The second
component of the claim captures the reduction in the value of resourceservices(e.g., pollution
impairing commercial activities and recreational opportunities in the affected area) pending
recovery of the injured resources. See Natural Resource Damages Assessment Regulations
(NRDA) for Hazardous Substances which have been codified at 43 CFR Part 11. Lost use
values are measured by changes in consumer surplus: "The compensable value includes the
value of lost public use of the services provided by the injured resources, plus lost nonuse
values such as existence and bequest values. Compensable value is measured by changes in
consumer surplus, economic rent, and any fees or other payments collectable by a Federal or
State agency or an Indian tribe for a private party's use of the natural resources; and any
economic rent accruing to a private party because the Federal or State agency or Indian tribe
does not charge a fee or price for the use of the resources"(43 CFR § 11.83(c)(1)). A survey
of the measurement of lost use values is presented by Jones et al., supra note 30, at 126-163.
It should also be noted that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
of the U.S. Department of Commerce promulgated NRDA regulations for OPA on January
5, 1996 (61 Fed. Reg. 440), which emphasize 'restoration-based measures' for compensating,
the interim loss component of natural resource damage claims, ('resource compensation'). See
Carol A. Jones, The New Restoration-BasedMeasuresof Compensation in NaturalResource
Damage Assessment Regulations: Methodological Challenges, 16 AERE NEWSLETTER 5-8
(1996). The NOAA regulations are currently being challenged in GeneralElectricCo.v. U.S.
Department of Commerce, No. 96-1096 (D.C. Cir.).
" See generally Wetterstein, supra note 26, at 50-54; see also Marie-Louise Larsson,
supra note 30, at 584-589.
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been made in the text, for example, that the shipowner has an obligation to
acquire "equivalent resources and habitat" when restoration of the environment cannot reasonably be made (cf. Art. 2.8. of the Council of Europe
Convention on Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the
Environment, 199334).35
Pursuant to the definition of "carriage by sea" in Art. 1.9. the HNS
Convention covers the period from the time when the hazardous and noxious
substances enter any part of the ship's equipment, on loading, to the time
they cease to be present in any part of the ship's equipment, on discharge.
If no ship's equipment is used, the period begins and ends respectively when
these substances cross the ship's rail.
This definition of carriage is another source of interpretative difficulties.
What is meant by "ship's equipment?" Is the decisive factor ownership (cf.
proprietary or possessory interests) of the equipment used, or does the notion
cover all equipment on board the ship irrespective of ownership? Is there
an internationally uniform meaning of the concept "ship's equipment?"
Since the risk of damage is rather substantial in connection with
loading/unloading operations (e.g., the Grandcampdisaster 194736), one can
question the appropriateness of delimiting the coverage of the HNS
Convention by such, as it seems, unclear and difficult criteria. A better and
more appropriate solution would have been to cover the whole period of

" The Explanatory Report (Draft Convention on Civil Liabilityfor Damage Resulting
from Activities Dangerousto the Environment and Explanatory Report, COUNCIL OF EUR.
Doc. (DIR/JUR 92) 2 (1993) contains the following statement: "When it is impossible to
restore or re-establish the environment, the measures of reinstatement may be in the form of
the reintroduction of equivalent components into the environment. This applies for example
in the case of the disappearance of an animal species or the irreparable destruction of a
biotope. Such damage cannot be evaluated financially and any reinstatement of the
environment is in theory impossible. Since such difficulties must not lead to a complete
absence of compensation, a specific method of compensation has been introduced. This
method of compensation is based on achieving an equivalent instead of an identical
environment" (at 28). On such issues, see also Colin de la Rue, EnvironmentalDamage
Assessment in TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND INSURANCE 70-72 (Ralph
P. Kr6ner ed., 1993).
3"The American OPA covers not only "costs of removal", but also "the cost of restoring,
rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of, the damaged natural resources" (33
U.S.C. § 2706 (d)(I)(A-C). Cf. 43 CFR § 11.80 (1996) (regarding CERCLA).
36 See supra note I and related text.
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loading/unloading, 37 as in Art. 4.1 of the United Nations Convention on the
Carriageof Goods by Sea, 1978 (the Hamburg Rules).3"
B. Strict Liability With Exceptions
Art. 7 of the HNS Convention provides that the shipowner has strict
liability for damage caused by HNS substances on board his ship. Strict
liability is in conformity with the solutions in, inter alia, the oil pollution
conventions. Likewise, the exceptions under Art. 7.2, subparas. (a) - (c)
correspond to the rules in the oil pollution field. No liability shall be
attached to the shipowner if he proves that the damage resulted from an act
of war (or similar act) or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable
and irresistible character (a). Concerning natural phenomena it is noteworthy, that the HNS Fund is not excepted from liability (cf. Art. 14.3.).
However, there is a special rule limiting amounts for damage resulting from
natural phenomena to 250 million SDRs maximum (Art. 14.5.(b)). One can
of course question the appropriateness of excepting the shipowner, but not
the Fund (i.e., the importers). But considering the argument put forward that
the hazardous character of the cargo motivates a separate HNS Fund, such
a division of the risk may ultimately be reasonable.
Further, the shipowner is excepted if he proves that "the damage was
wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of any Government
or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other
navigational aids in the exercise of that function" (c). This exception has
caused great interpretative difficulties in the oil pollution field,39 and,

" The U.S. delegation made a proposal (CW/WP2) that the HNS Convention should cover
the whole period from the commencement of the loading until the unloading has been
finished. The diplomatic conference did not, however, adopt the proposal.
" UnitedNations Convention on the Carriageof Goods by Sea, Mar. 31, 1978, 17 I.L.M.
608. Art. 4.1. of the Hamburg Rules: "The responsibility of the carrier for the goods under
this Convention covers the period during which the carrier is in charge of the goods at the
port of loading, during the carriage and at the port of discharge".
" On this exception, see, e.g., Abecassis & Jarashow supranote 15, at 205-206, and JOHN
H. BATES & CHARLES BENSON, MARINE ENVIRONMENT LAW 4.24 (1993). See also the
Swedish Supreme Court decision MIT Tsesis, ND (NORDISKE DOMME I SJOFARTSANLIG-

1 (1983), where the court held that incorrect nautical charts came within the
exception. For a comment on the Tsesis decision, see Clads J. Palme, Oil Pollution - The
Tsesis Case, in FESTSKRIFT TILL JACOB W.F. SUNDBERG 229-239 (1993). In M/TJosd Marti,
ND 64 (1987), the Svea Court of Appeal held that pilot's negligence was outside the
exception.
GENDER)
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consequently, it is not a success from the viewpoint of harmonizing
international maritime law. Voices have been raised to delete this exception,
but the 1992 Protocols to the oil pollution conventions still maintain it. One
can also ask whether it is reasonable to except the shipowner and his insurer
from such risks closely connected with the running of ships. In any event,
the text of this exception needs some clarification.
There is one more exception from liability. According to Art. 7.2(d) the
shipowner is free from liability if he proves that the shipper (or any other
person) has failed to furnish information concerning the hazardous and
noxious nature of the substances shipped and that this failure has caused the
damage (wholly or partly) or has led the shipowner not to obtain insurance
in accordance with Art. 12. A further condition requires that neither the
shipowner nor his servants or agents knew or ought reasonably to have
known of the dangerous nature of the goods shipped. Since such an
exception is lacking from the oil pollution regime, one may reasonably ask
whether such an additional exception from the strict liability rule is needed.
Arguments against the exception are, inter alia, the need for uniformity
within the maritime compensation system, the shipowner's right to recourse
actions, and the difficulties of proof such a rule obviously will cause. The
exception may lead to much litigation and the involvement of the HNS Fund
even in small compensation matters. On the other hand, it must be admitted
that oil cargoes are more homogeneous and easier to control than HNS
goods, which might be an argument in favor of the solution adopted.
C. Limitation of Liability
Concerning limitation of liability (Art. 9), it is of course essential that the
limits are high enough. This is especially important regarding the "minimum
limit", since small ships often transport high risk goods. The administration
of the -NS Fund should not be loaded with a lot of small claims. The limit
of liability for ships up to 2,000 tons is 10 million SDRs. Whether this is
an appropriate limit will be shown in the future.40

It has to be noted that pursuant to Art. 5 of the HNS Convention a Contracting State
may, at the time of ratification or any time thereafter, declare that the Convention does not
apply to ships which do not exceed 200 gross tonnage when these ships carry HNS goods in
packaged form between ports of that state. This exception was justified by the desire to
promote the transport situation of small island states. It may also be difficult for such ships
to arrange compulsory insurance in accordance with the HNS Convention.
40
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As regards the constitution of the limitation fund, two alternative systems
were suggested in the draft HNS Convention. According to the first
alternative, the shipowner was obliged, in order to have the right to limit his
liability, to constitute a "free standing" limitation fund, that is, a limitation
fund which only covered HNS claims. Consequently, if a single occasion
resulted in different types of claims, each claim was covered by its own
limitation rules (the rules on oil pollution liability, the general limitation
rules, the HNS system, etc.). According to the second alternative, the
general limitation fund (constituted in conformity with the limitation
conventions of 1924, 1957 or 1976, or with national law) should also cover
HNS claims ("linkage"). If, however, the sums available for compensation
were insufficient, the shipowner would have had to constitute a supplementary fund up to the limits of the HNS system. Consequently, non-HNS
claimants would be competing with HNS claimants in the general limitation
fund. This could have resulted in less compensation for the former group
of claimants than what they would get under free standing funds.
Considering both the last mentioned viewpoint and the technical and other
difficulties connected with the "linkage" alternative, free standing limitation
funds seem to be more appropriate. This was also the decision of the
London conference. During the conference it was maintained, however,
without any specifying proof, that the "linkage" alternative would facilitate
larger insurance capacity (or in other words, it would be cheaper for the
shipowners). Be that as it may, it was important to choose a solution
favorable to claimants other than HNS claimants, considering especially that
the general limitation amounts are quite inadequate. 4 Furthermore, my
impression is that the development of liability rules is more governed by the
P&I market than steered by the lawmakers. It should be the other way
around: the P&I and the insurance market should follow the lawmakers (cf.
the development in other fields of environmental impairment liability).4"
In connection with capacity matters it may be noted that the division of
the HNS Fund into one general account and three separate accounts for oil,
4' It must be noted, however, that the London conference also adopted a Protocol to
amend the 1976 limitation convention (LLMC) which raises the limitation amounts 2.4 times.
The Protocol also contains the important provision, that a Contracting State may exclude HNS
claims from the coverage of the LLMC (Art. 7.1(b). See IMO LEG/CONF. I O/DC.2, May 2,
1996 (Protocol of 1996 to Amend the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime
Claims, 1976).
42 See Peter Wetterstein, P&I and EnvironmentalDamage, in LAW UNDER
EXOGENOUS
INFLUENCES, I PUBLICATIONS OF TURKU LAW SCHOOL 78-113 (Markku Suksi ed., 1994).
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liquefied natural gas (LNG) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) seems
doubtful. However some industrial nations with large imports of hazardous
substances, especially Japan, demanded such a division. The system with
separate accounts was seen as a way to avoid cross-subsidization between
different HNS substances.4" Considering that such a division into separate
accounts may have a detrimental effect on the compensative capacity of the
Fund in larger accidents and may also increase the administrative difficulties
in calculating the contributions, a single account system would have been
preferable.
D. Time Limits for Claims
The provisions on limitation of actions in the HNS Convention cause some
problems. Pursuant to Art. 37.1 an action for compensation under Chapter
II (shipowner's liability) must be brought within three years from the date
when the person suffering the damage knew or ought reasonably to have
known of the damage and of the identity of the owner. Further, according
to Art. 37.2 rights to compensation from the HNS Fund will be extinguished
unless an action is brought, or a notification pursuant to Art. 39.7 is made,
within three years from the date when the person suffering the damage knew
or ought reasonably to have known of the damage. Consequently, if a
claimant discovers the identity of the shipowner later than three years from
the date when he knew of the damage, a claim against the Fund might be
extinguished, for example, in cases of limitation of the shipowner's liability
or his insolvency. There may be occasions when it is difficult, as well as
time-consuming, to clarify that the damage has resulted from sea transport,
and not from land-based activity (cf. Art. 14.3(b) of the HNS Convention).
The time limits for claims against the Fund ought to correspond to-or even
exceed-the time limits against the shipowner. 4 Of importance is the level
of proof the Fund will require from the person suffering the damage (cf Art.
14.1.(b) of the HNS Convention). In any case, it seems important to bring
a claim against the Fund when damage occurs.
The ultimate time limit for bringing claims, that is, ten years from the date
of the incident which caused the damage (Art. 37.3), can also be criticized,
since many of the hazardous substances covered by the HNS Convention

" See IMO NEWS, supra note 4, at 8.
44

Different time limits may also confuse the persons suffering damage, see IMO
FEB. 1996 at 11.

LEG/CONF.I 0/6(A), 20
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may have harmful effects occurring later than ten years from the incident.
The methods of establishing causal links are constantly improving. Is it
desirable that such harmful effects might fall outside the HNS system or
should the time limit have been extended? An extension could have been
made either as a general extension45 or as an exception for certain hazardous substances/kinds of damage (e.g., personal injury).
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

In this article I have restricted myself to some comments on the HNS
Convention. More aspects, with corresponding criticisms, could have been
put forward.46 One has to remember, however, that the HNS Convention,
as other international treaties, is a compromise reflecting many differing
views and opinions (political, social, economic, etc.). The interesting
question is, therefore, whether the Convention really will have a unifying
effect on the maritime liability rules and will function as an adequate
international compensation system (cf. the oil pollution system). Primarily
these results depend on decisions national legislators will have to make, but
I believe that many states have a positive view and that the HNS Convention
will enter into force before too long. Many states, for example, Australia,
Japan, many EU countries, and the Nordic countries, expressed positive
attitudes toward the Convention during the London conference. However,
in practice states often "watch each other", which tends to delay international
conventions from the entering into force.
It is critical that most EU countries accede to the HNS Convention in
order to prevent the EU Commission from taking unilateral action. The
Commission has shown interest for liability questions in connection with the
transport of hazardous and noxious substances. A regional solution would,
however, not facilitate international uniformity.
Furthermore, it will be interesting to see what position the U.S., which has
a large chemical industry, will take. The U.S. has neither ratified the 1969

4 It is notable that the Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from
Activities Dangerous to the Environment, June 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1228 (1993), provides for an
ultimate time limit of thirty years (Art. 17.2.).
46A comprehensive presentation of the draft HNS Convention (1995) is given by Nicholas
Gaskell, The Draft Conventionon Liabilityand CompensationforDamage Resultingfrom the
Carriageof Hazardous and Noxious Substances, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HUGo TIBERG
225-296 (1996).
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Civil Liability Convention nor the 1971 Fund Convention 47 nor acceded to
the amending Protocols of 1984 4 8-although the country exerted considerable public and private pressure to shape these international instruments in
accordance with its own wishes (e.g., raising the monetary limits and
amounts in the conventions). Instead, the U.S. Congress adopted its own oil
pollution legislation, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. 49 The decision not to
accede to the 1984 Protocols was much criticized; for example, President
Bush chastised Congress for refusing to endorse the international oil spill
treaties."
It would be desirable for the U.S. to ratify the HNS Convention.
Arguments in favor of ratification are: the advantages of internationally

41 It is interesting to note that the U.S. declined to ratify the 1969 Civil Liability
Convention and the 1971 Fund Convention "largely because of dissatisfactionwith the liability
limits, the difficulty of increasing limits in the future, and concern for the states' role in
pollution protection." Thomas J. Wagner, The Oil PollutionAct of 1990: An Analysis, 21
J. MAR. L. & CoM. 569, 572 (1990). However, in spite of the U.S. dissatisfaction with the
international limits, the domestic limits remained roughly equal to the international limits from
1978 to 1990. Id.
48 The Protocols of 1984 were replaced by the Protocols of 1992. The prior Protocols
never entered into force, largely because of strong U.S. opposition. See also de la Rue, supra
note 15, at 2.
49 Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended
at 33 U.S.C. 2701-2761 (Supp. 111990)). One important manifestation of the Exxon Valdez
spill in March 1989 was that the long-delayed comprehensive oil spill legislation (OPA)
finally passed Congress and was signed by President Bush on Saturday 18 August 1990-16
months and 25 days after the accident. Prior to the Exxon Valdez spill, the enactment of any
type of comprehensive oil spill legislation had proved impossible-despite the obvious need
for a supplementation, if not overhaul, of existing oil pollution legislation. Since 1975 several
bills to combine all state and federal oil spill liability laws into a uniform national program
had been proposed and had subsequently died. See Wetterstein, supra note 30, at 75-77.
"oPresident Bush stated, inter alia,: "H.R. 1465 does not implement the 1984 Protocols
to the 1969 Civil Liability Convention and the 1971 Fund Convention. These oil spill treaties,
if ratified, would provide our Nation with swift and assured compensation for foreign tanker
oil spills and access to up to $260 million per spill from an international fund. Our failure
to ratify the Protocols may weaken long-standing U.S. leadership in the development of
international maritime standards ...
Ultimately, the threat of oil pollution is a global
challenge, and the solutions we devise must be broad enough to address the needs of all
nations. Therefore, I urge the Senate to give immediate consideration to the international
Protocols and give its advice and consent to ratification of these treaties". 36 SCANDINAVIAN
SHIPPING GAZETTE 7 (1990). Senate Democratic leader George Mitchell led the opposition
to the international protocols, as he feared it would limit the liability of major oil companies
in the event of a spill. LLOYD'S LIST, Monday August 20 (1990).
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uniform liability systems; the aim to decrease the unpredictability and
*uncertainty of the legal framework surrounding accidents involving carriage
by sea of hazardous and noxious substances; access to the international
compensation scheme; etc. 5 Since this is the first international convention
of its kind, a U.S. ratification would further the willingness of other nations
to accede to it. Possible conflicts with U.S. national law, for example, the
broad notion of recoverable natural resource damages under
CERCLA 52/OPA compared with the more restrictive definition in the HNS
Convention and the differing provisions on limitation of liability, could be
53
solved by complementary domestic compensation arrangements.
The HNS Convention is comprehensive in both its coverage of hazardous
and noxious substances (currently more than 6,000) and its geographical
application. 4 Strict liability of the shipowner, together with the complementary HNS Fund, strengthen the position of claimants. The Convention
contains advantages for the shipowner, as well, inter alia,by speeding up the
claims procedure and minimizing possibilities of arrest or other security
measures. The HNS Convention could thus form an acceptable basis for a
functioning international compensation system. However, as was stated

"' Cf. Wetterstein, supra note 30, at 198-200.
52 The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C.A. § 9601 et seq., 1980 (with later amendments). N.b., federal law, does not cover oil
pollution damage. See Wetterstein, supra note 30, at 102-124, 160-181. While the Clean
Water Act (CWA) may be applicable to spills of hazardous substances in waterways, neither
Act covers private claims for damages (other than "clean-up costs") 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
'3 Ratification would not prevent the U.S. from establishing a complementary domestic
compensation fund (over and above the international HNS Fund and financed by e.g., taxes
and fees on chemicals, gases, and similar products) to cover incidents and circumstances not
covered by the HNS Fund. Cf Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Liabilityfor Spills and Discharges
of Oil and Hazardous Substances from Vessels, 20 FORUM 152, 163 (1984) (noting that
ratification of the Civil Liability Convention and Fund Convention together with the 1984
Protocols would not prevent U.S. establishment of a complementary domestic liability fund).
Ratification would also unify U.S. national law because any other federal or state law will,
by necessity, be preempted by the international treaty insofar as it is in conflict with the latter.
See U.S. Const. Art. VI cl. 2.
14 According to Art. 3 the HNS Convention shall apply to any damage caused in the
territory, including the territorial sea, of a Contracting State (a). Covered are also damage
by contaminationof the environmentcaused in the exclusive economic zone of a Contracting
State (b), and damage, other than damage by contamination of the environment, caused
outside the territory, including the territorial sea, of any State, if this damage has been caused
by a substance carried on board a ship registeredina ContractingState(c). Finally, the HNS
Convention applies to preventive measures, wherever taken (d).
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earlier, the international success of the Convention depends upon the
compensation amounts being adequate and the administration of the system
not being too complex and unwieldy, especially regarding the reporting
obligation put on the receivers of HNS cargoes.
As a general observation one can say in conclusion that the splitting of the
maritime liability into many conventions with varying Contracting States
seems doubtful. We now have conventions on nuclear liability, oil pollution
liability, HNS liability, limitation of liability, as well as ongoing discussions
for conventions on bunker liability, liability for wreck removal, compulsory
liability insurance, etc. Such developments restrain efforts to achieve
internationally uniform and effective solutions. Furthermore, separate
conventions impede the possibilities of effectively using the capacity of the
insurance market. It ought to be possible to agree that only the oil pollution
liability, due to its homogeneity and well developed compensation system,
and the nuclear liability, because of its special character, should be covered
by separate conventions and that, otherwise, liability should be governed by
one maritime liability convention. Under such a convention strict liability,
together with compulsory insurance or other financial guarantee, should be
channelled to the shipowner, and the limitation amounts should be as high
as possible (or unlimited liability should be introduced5 5). The insurance
market ought to follow and adjust itself to developments within the maritime
liability field. 6 Instead of a "two-tier" system with administrative and
other difficulties, the insurance market should bear the costs of compensation. The costs (premiums) for the shipowners would thus be transferred to
their customers and, consequently, to the consumers and other users of
transported goods." Relevant liability questions in the relationship between
shipowners and charterers can be regulated in the charterparties. Such a
compensation system would also harmonize with the "polluter pays"
principle5" which is gaining increasing support in international environmen-

" On unlimited liability, see Wetterstein, supra note 42, at 103-108, also published in P&I
INSURANCE, 71 GOTHENBURG MAR. L. Ass'N 133-136 (1995).
56See supra note 55 and accompanying references.
7 Also

from the environmental point of view, this seems "quite acceptable as consumers
of pollutants must be prepared to take greater responsibility for environmental costs." Edgar
Gold, MarinePollution Liability After 'Exxon Valdez': The U.S. 'All-Or-Nothing' Lottery,
22 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 423 439 (1991).
"The "polluter pays" principle was originally defined to finance preventive measures, but
the principle has been expanded also to incorporate costs for damage to the environment. The
theoretical basis of the "polluter pays" principle is the "internalization of external costs". The
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tal law. Although cargoes undeniably often are hazardous, it is, nevertheless,
fault or negligence on the part of the ship that mostly causes accidents.

principle has been supported by the OECD and was incorporated in EC law through the 1987
Single European Act (Art. 130r) and in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. On this principle, see
LARSSON, supra note 30, at 78-82 with references.

